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Over the last decade, disabled moviegoers have been met with
adversity due to the prevalence of stadium seating. These patrons
were often left with seats at the front of theaters in one large group,
rather than at the various positions and viewing angles provided to
other patrons. When the Access Board regulated viewing angles
under the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines
("ADAAG") section 4.33.3,1 an ambiguity was left as to what it means
to require that disabled patrons be given "lines of sight comparable" to
other patrons. The federal circuit courts have split over whether that
language requires comparable viewing angles in stadium seating
theaters, or simply an unobstructed view of the screen. The Access
Board has since released a new regulation that clarifies the problem to
1.
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings
and Facilities, 36 C.F.R. pt. 1191, app. A (2002), repealed by 69 Fed. Reg. 44,084 (July 23,
2004).
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the extent that the Act definitely considers viewing angles. 2 However,
the old regulation was controlling law when many buildings were
constructed or altered, and the difference in circuit opinions may leave
many movie theaters suddenly out of compliance with the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA").
In 1990, Congress stated in its fact-finding for the ADA that
"society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with
disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a
serious and pervasive social problem." 3 Only a handful of acts passed
by Congress protected disabled persons before the passage of the ADA
in 1990. 4 As late as 1961, there were not even guidelines for builders
to obtain a minimum amount of accessibility for commonly used
buildings. 5 Moreover, the pre-ADA guidelines were not adopted by all
6
state governments.
Congress, in passing the ADA, found that disabled persons not
only faced overt discrimination, but also faced discrimination when
buildings were not built or modified to allow accessibility. 7 The ADA
therefore affected both new constructions and building alterations
after January 26, 1992.8 It was passed "to provide clear, strong,
consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against
individuals with disabilities. 9
The Access Board is an independent Federal agency that
suggests criteria under the ADA which other federal agencies, such as
the Department of Justice or Department of Transportation, later
promulgate. 10 It recently suggested amendments to the portion of the
ADA dealing with viewing angles in movie theaters to require that
viewing angles of a movie screen provided for disabled customers be
"substantially equivalent" to those provided to all other customers.11

2.
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings
and Facilities; Architectural Barriers Act (ABA) Accessibility Guidelines, 36 C.F.R. pt.
1191.1, apps. A-E (2005).
3.
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 USC § 12101(a)(2) (2000).
4.
LAURA F. ROTHSTEIN, DISABILITIES AND THE LAW 3 (2d ed. 1997).
5.
Id.

6.

Id.

7.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5).
8.
Id. § 12183(a).
9.
Id. § 12101(b)
10.
See United States Access Board, About the United States Access Board,
http://www.access.board.gov/about.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
11.
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings
and Facilities; Architectural Barriers Act (ABA) Accessibility Guidelines, 36 C.F.R. pt.
1191.1, app. B, § 221.2.3 (2005).
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Prior to this amendment, however, the circuits were split over
language requiring that disabled moviegoers receive "lines of sight
comparable" to those provided to all other patrons. The Fifth Circuit
believed that this language only required theater owners to give
disabled patrons an unobstructed view of the screen. 12 The other
circuits read the language as requiring some sort of similarity in angle
between the lines of sight given to disabled persons and those given to
other patrons. 13
The Access Board, in reaction to the circuit split, repealed the
original regulation and promulgated the new one, 14 but not before the
circuits interpreted the original law, which was effective when many
theaters were built or altered. This leaves "thousands of movie
theaters [to] discover that they are out of compliance with the law,
and that they must destroy facilities built in compliance with the law
1' 5
according to the best knowledge of design professionals at the time.
Section 221.2.3 codified the position that there must be some
comparability between the viewing angles of disabled patrons and
other moviegoers,1 6 but it is still not clear exactly what the difference
between allowable angles is. In order to rectify this problem before
the circuits again split, this time as to what viewing angles are
acceptable, the Access Board should promulgate an amendment to
section 221.2.3 that states exactly what standard those building new
facilities or altering old ones are required to provide to disabled
patrons. Two possibilities are: (1) requiring the viewing angles
provided to disabled patrons be within a set amount of degrees from
the average viewing angle of all other seats in a theater; or (2) simply
providing a range of viewing angles that are acceptable.
In Part I, the history of disability law in the United States will
17
be discussed, following the decision of Brown v. Board of Education
until the passage of the ADA. The purpose and contents of the ADA
will, in pertinent part, then be discussed, as will the language of the
Act that caused the circuits to split and the language of the Act as it
now stands. The contents of the circuit court cases from the First,
Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits will be analyzed, separating the

12.
Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 207 F.3d 783, 789 (5th Cir. 2000).
13.
See, e.g., Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 339 F.3d 1126,
1131 (9th Cir. 2003).
14.
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings
and Facilities; Architectural Barriers Act (ABA) Accessibility Guidelines, 69 Fed. Reg.
44,084 (Jul. 23, 2004) (codified as amended at 36 C.F.R. pt. 1191.1, apps. A-E (2005)).
15.
Id. at 1134.
16.
36 C.F.R. pt. 1191.1, app. B, § 221.2.3 (2005).
17.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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circuits into majority (First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits) and minority
(Fifth Circuit) positions.
In Part II the majority and minority
positions, as well as the current language of ADAAG § 221.2.3, will be
examined for problems, and the strengths of each view will be
discussed. Finally, in Part III, a course of action will be suggested to
the Access Board to remedy the problems that remain among the
circuits despite the new language in the regulation.
I. DISABILITY LAW AND THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT

A. DisabilityLaw Before the Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990
Before the advent of the ADA, those who were discriminated
against because of a disability often did not have a legal method to
deal with their grievance.' 8 Although a few acts prior to the middle of
the twentieth century dealt with protecting those with disabilities,
they were largely limited to getting medical attention to children with
crippling disabilities, and to dealing with the employability of those
19
with disabilities.
In 1954, the United States Supreme Court decided Brown,
rejecting the "separate but equal" doctrine of the old Courts and
finding that racially segregated public schools violated the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 20 This case is not
only a landmark case in racial equal rights cases, but in all civil rights
cases; it paved the way for the legal movement towards equal
protection of disabled persons.
It was not until 1961 that the American National Standards
Institute (ANSI) released suggested minimum accessibility guidelines
2
for common buildings that some state and federal statutes adopted. '
In the early 1970s, some lower courts began to expand the holding of
Brown within the field of education to apply to students with mental
disabilities. 22 These cases led to the Education for All Handicapped

18.
Cf. 24 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4) (2000) (illustrating absence of statutory right to
remedy for disability discrimination).
19.
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4, at 3.
20.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
21.
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4, at 3 (the ANSI standards were incorporated, to some
extent, by the federal government in both the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4151, and the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. § 1612).
22.
Id. See generally Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Penn.
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp. 1275 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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Children Act, which was later renamed the Individuals with
23
Disabilities Education Act.
In 1973, the Rehabilitation Act represented another significant
step towards the equality of disabled persons. 24 It applied to the
federal government and covered three major sections: (1)
"nondiscrimination and affirmative action by federal employers"; (2)
"nondiscrimination and affirmative action in employer requirements
for federal contracts"; and (3) "nondiscrimination and reasonable
accommodation" in programs receiving federal funding. 25 The
Rehabilitation Act was the most far-reaching disability act until the
ADA was promulgated in 1990, because it included "education
programs, public facilities, transportation, and health and welfare
services." 26 The Rehabilitation Act gave the task of giving further
federal recognition of "the importance of access to the physical
environment" to the Architectural and Transportation Barriers
27
Compliance Board.
Despite Congress passing three more major pieces of legislation
in 1975,28 advocates for disabled persons were disappointed by a lack
of enforcement. 29 Eventually, pressure caused the President to issue
an Executive Order in 1976 to force the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) to issue regulations under the
30
Rehabilitation Act.
HEW subsequently "issued model minimum regulations to be
followed by each federal agency providing federal financial assistance
in issuing their own ... regulations." 3 1 However, lax enforcement due
to reasons including federal agencies' reluctance to enforce against
individual complaints led individuals to bring their complaints to the
judicial system. 32 Most cases brought in the 1970s dealt with

23.
24.

20 U.S.C. § 1400; see ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4, at 4.
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4, at 4; see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-796.

25.
26.

ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4, at 4.
Id.

27.

Id.

28.
Id. at 51; see Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 6000; National Housing Act Amendments, and the Department of Transportation
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 93-391, 88 Stat. 768 (1974); Pub. L. No. 94-173, 89 Stat.
1027 (1975). Each sought to remove barriers to disabled persons in a particular field.
29.
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4, at 4.
30.
Exec. Order No. 11,914, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (April 28, 1976).
31.
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4, at 5; see also Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities, 36 C.F.R. pt. 1190 (2002), repealed by
69 Fed. Reg. 44,084 (July 23, 2004).
32.
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4, at 5.
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procedural issues under the Rehabilitation Act, and it was not until
33
the 1980s that substantive issues began to be addressed.
In 1978, the Rehabilitation Act was amended to include the
remedies and rights provided by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act,
including the awarding of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. 34 The
Supreme Court first interpreted the Rehabilitation Act in 1979, when
it decided that for a successful claim, a person, despite having a
disability, must still meet the requirements to participate in a federal
program, but a failure to alter programs to allow disabled persons
35
could be discrimination.
Throughout the 1980s, controversy continued over the validity
of regulations promulgated by federal agencies in fields like
transportation and education. For instance, in 1981, the Department
of Transportation issued regulations requiring mass transit systems to
take special steps to make the transit systems accessible to disabled
persons.3 6 The Supreme Court later held that "federal financial
assistance by one program within an institution does not subject the
37
entire institution to coverage by one of several civil rights statutes."
However, this decision was changed by the Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1987,38 which "provides that if any part of a program or activity
receives assistance which subjects it to [the Rehabilitation Act], all
operations of the program are subject to [the Act]."39
B. The Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990
Those with disabilities often faced not only overt
discrimination, but they also faced discrimination because of a failure
to modify existing facilities. 40 Congress's purpose in enacting the ADA
was to "provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards
addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities. ' 41 For
purposes of the ADA, 42 "a motion picture house, theater, concert hall,

33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id. at 6; see Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000a-3(b) (2000).
See Southeastern Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap, 49 C.F.R. pt. 27 (1981).

37.
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4, at 9; see also Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555,
574 (1984), superseded by statute, as stated in O'Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 117 (1997).
38.
Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered
statutes of 20 U.S.C.).
39.
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4, at 9.
40.
See Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (2000).
41.
Id. § 12101(b)(2).
42.
Id. § 12101.
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stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment" is considered a
43
public accommodation, and thus falls within the purview of the act.
The ADA is "the most significant disability rights statute"
because "it broadens the coverage of protection for individuals with
disabilities by extension to a much broader group of employers, public
transportation
programs,
accommodations,
public
services,
telecommunications, and public opportunity providers." 44 Practically
every field is now controlled by ADA regulations, with the exception of
45
insurance.
The ADA not only applies to new construction, but whenever
"major changes, such as remodeling, renovation, rehabilitation,
rearrangement of structural parts or walls or full-height partitions are
made, accessibility requirements [in the ADA] will apply."46 However,
because of the nature of the Act and the large financial costs involved,
the ADA did not apply immediately. Instead, it stipulated that
alterations that began after January 26, 1992 in places of public
accommodation had to provide to the greatest feasible extent
47
accessibility to the areas that were altered.
Moreover, the ADA does not apply only to new and altered
facilities. "The greatest mandate to make existing facilities accessible
48
is under Title III of the ADA relating to public accommodations."
This section of the ADA may be enforced by both private individuals
through judicial suits, and by the Attorney General. 49 Remedies may
include "injunctive relief, requirements to provide aid or services,
modifications of policies and practices, monetary damages (but not
punitive damages), and civil penalties."50
An action exists under the ADA if any "individual [is]
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation." 51 Further, the
ADA makes it discrimination to "afford an individual or class of
individuals, on the basis of a disability . . . the opportunity to
participate in or benefit from a good, service, facility, privilege,

43.

Id. § 12181(7)(c).

44.

ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4, at 14.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id. at -396-397.
Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a).
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4, at 397.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12188.
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4, at 399 (discussing the listed remedies in 42 U.S.C. §

12188).

51.

42 USC § 12182(a).

406

VANDERBILTJ. OFENTERTAINMENTAND TECH.LAW

[Vol. 8:2:399

advantage, or accommodation that is not equal to that afforded to
other individuals." 52 The term "individual or class of individuals" in
53
the ADA includes "customers of the covered public accommodation."
C. The Sightline Regulation
Under the ADAAG, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
promulgates regulations for the interpretation of the ADA. In the
original regulation of the ADA, the DOJ required that "[w]heelchair
areas shall be an integral part of any fixed seating plan and shall be
provided so as to provide people with physical disabilities a choice of
admission prices and lines of sight comparable to those for members of
54
the general public."
In late 2004, the Access Board, which releases regulations to be
considered for promulgation by the DOJ, released a suggested
amendment that requires that "wheelchair spaces shall be dispersed
and shall provide wheelchair users a choice 'of seating locations and
viewing angles that are substantially equivalent to, or better than,'
those 'available to all other spectators.' "55 The DOJ revised Title III of
the ADA, effective January 2005, to include the Access Board's
suggested amendment. 56 However, this amendment only applies to
57
new constructions and altered facilities.
D. The Circuit Split
The circuit courts presently have two interpretations on the
DOJ's current regulation dealing with a disabled person's view in a
movie theater. The majority circuit view, shared by the First, Sixth,
and Ninth Circuits, requires that a movie theater with stadium
seating provide viewing angles of the screen for disabled persons that
are not inferior to those shared by other patrons. 58 The Fifth Circuit,
52.

Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii).

53.

Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv).

54.

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings

and Facilities, 36 C.F.R. pt. 1191, app. A, ch. 4, § 4.33.3 (2002), repealed by 69 Fed. Reg.
44,084 (July 23, 2004).
55.
United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558, 565 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings and Facilities;
Architectural Barriers Act (ABA) Accessibility Guidelines, 36 C.F.R. pt. 1191, app. B, § 221

(2005)).
56.
Unified Agenda, 69 Fed.Reg. 37,749 (June 28, 2004) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pt.
1191.1 (2005)).
57.
See id.
58.
See, e.g., United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569, 575 (6th Cir.
2003).
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on the other hand, decided that "lines of sight comparable" means
nothing more than an unobstructed view of the screen.5 9 The Ninth
Circuit's decision in this line of cases was considered for review by the
United States Supreme Court, but was later opposed for certiorari by
the Solicitor General. It was subsequently turned down for review by
the Court, with the Solicitor General noting that the new Access
60
Board amendment would provide more direction for the courts soon.
1. The Majority Position - The First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits
Although the Fifth Circuit decided Lara v. Cinemark three
years prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Oregon Paralyzed
Veterans of America v. Regal Cinemas,6 1 the Ninth Circuit announced
the majority rule. Three wheelchair-using disabled persons brought
suit in Oregon against movie theater operators, including Regal
Cinemas (Regal), which operated theaters with stadium seating where
the majority of seating for disabled persons was located in the first few
rows. 62 "[E]xperts, who visited the theaters and conducted research
there, found that the vertical lines of sight for the wheelchair seating
locations ranged from 24 to 60 degrees, with an average of
approximately 42 degrees, as compared with the average median line
63
of sight of 20 degrees in the non-wheelchair seating."
The DOJ issued an amicus brief in Lara in which it interpreted
the ADA "to require that, in stadium-style theaters, 'wheelchair
locations must be provided lines of sight in the stadium seating seats
within the range of viewing angles as those offered to most of the
general public in the stadium style seats, adjusted for seat tilt.' "64
While the Lara court and the district court in Oregon Paralyzed
Veterans rejected this statement for reasons that will be discussed
later, the Ninth Circuit in Oregon Paralyzed Veterans itself found that
the interpretation still warranted "substantial deference." 65 The court
went on to state that the seats available to wheelchair-bound patrons
in the theaters at issue were "objectively uncomfortable, requiring [the
patrons] to crane their necks and twist their bodies in order to see the

59.
Lara v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 207 F.3d 783, 789 (5th Cir. 2000)
60.
Stewmon v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 542 U.S. 937 (2004), denying cert. to Or.
Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 339 F.3d 1126 (2003); Brief for the U.S.
as Amicus Curiae, Stewmon v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 542 U.S. 937 (2004) (No. 03-641).
61.
Or. Paralyzed Veterans, 339 F.3d at 1127-28.
62.
Id. at 1128.
63.
Id. at 1128.
64.
Id. at 1130.
65.
Id. at 1131 (citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 612 (1994)).
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screen, while non-disabled patrons have a wide range of comfortable
66
viewing locations from which to choose."
A similar decision was sent down by the Sixth Circuit in U.S. v.
Cinemark USA, Inc. Cinemark, like the companies in Oregon
Paralyzed Veterans, operated a number of movie theaters with
stadium seating. 67 In Cinemark's theaters, the "wheelchair
placements [were] generally located on a flat portion of the auditorium
approximately one-third of the way back from the screen." 68 The
government alleged that wheelchair-using patrons would sometimes
have to "look up at the screen at sharp angles, resulting in severe
69
discomfort and pain."
The Sixth Circuit held that reading the portion of the ADAAG
dealing with lines of sight furthered the purposes of the ADA if it
included a requirement of checking viewing angles. 70 Further, the
court went on to state that "the language cited by the Fifth Circuit [in
Lara] does not definitively support the conclusion that the Access
Board acknowledged that additional language will be necessary to
codify the DOJ's litigating position."7 1 The court also found that the
Fifth Circuit's reading did not consider the use of the word
"comparable" in the statute when used to describe what kind of line of
sight is required. 72 "In order to be comparable," stated the court,
"viewing angles must also be taken into account to some degree." 73
The court left the district court to "determine the extent to which lines
of sight must be similar for wheelchair patrons in stadium-style
theaters, but [held] that the plain meaning of 'lines of sight
comparable to those for members of the general public' clearly
requires more points of similarity than merely an unobstructed
view."

74

Finally, the First Circuit weighed in on the matter in United
States v. Hoyt's Cinemas Corp., further entrenching the majority
position. 75 However, the court in Hoyts did not announce a position

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 1133.
See United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569, 572 (6th Cir. 2003).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 576.
Id. at 577.
Id. at 578.
Id. at 579.
Id. (quoting Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for

Buildings and Facilities, 36 C.F.R. pt. 1191, app. A, § 4.33.3 (2002), repealed by 69 Fed.
Reg. 44,084 (July 23, 2004)).
75.
See United States v. Hoyt's Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558, 575 (1st Cir. 2004).
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that was nearly as forceful as the majority in Cinemark.76 The First
Circuit noted that it:
[Wiould have been child's play for the drafters to make clear that the 'lines of sight'
requirement encompassed not only unobstructed views - a classic problem for
wheelchair occupants in many types of auditoriums and arenas ...but also angles
of sight. Yet
the [DOJ] and the Access Board apparently took no such position
77
until 1998.

However, the court further opined that "the better reading of
the regulation is that it takes angles of sight into account," even
though the framers of the ADA may have never considered viewing
78
angles at all.
The First Circuit held that the best meaning of the statute was
not found in the text of the statute itself but in the "underlying policy
of the statute. ' 79 The court wrote: "If most or all of the wheelchair sites
in the theater have badly degraded views and most or all of the nonwheelchair seats have good viewing angles, the basic objective of the
statute would surely be undermined. 8 0° While the court suggested that
viewing angles exceeding thirty-five degrees to the top of the screen
are uncomfortable, it did not go so far as to find an explicit angle that
what
would be required.8 1 The court did admit that determining
82
viewing angles are comparable is a "fact-intensive" process.
The court finally went on to briefly discuss the Access Board's
amended section 4.33.3:
[I]f adopted by the [DOJ, the amendment] goes a long way to determining for the
future the extremely difficult question of how much "comparability" is required for
new construction. But it is an amendment, not a gloss on the existing regulation,
83
and therefore does not itself govern existing theaters (future alterations aside).

2. The Minority Position - The Fifth Circuit
It was the Fifth Circuit in 2000 that took the first bite at the
proverbial stadium-seating apple.8 4 The court initially took a plain
meaning approach to the statute and found that the terms
"comparable choice of admission prices" and "comparable lines of

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See at 566.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 566-67.
Id. at 567.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 575.
Lara v. Cinemark U.S.A., Inc., 207 F.3d 783, 789 (5th Cir. 2000).
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sight" are two separate phrases, meaning that the term "choice of'
does not apply to lines of sight. 85
Cinemark, in contentions similar to those brought forward in
the other cases in this line, stated that its wheelchair-accessible areas
were in the middle of the seating area and unobstructed, thus
comparable to the seats provided to non-disabled patrons. 86 The court
found this reasoning persuasive and held that "[u]nlike questions of
'viewer obstruction,' which the DOJ and Access Board explicitly
considered before issuing section 4.33.3, . . . questions regarding
'viewing angle' did not arise until well after the DOJ promulgated
section 4.33.3."87 The court pointed out that other statutes that used
the term "line of sight" referred only to an unobstructed view.8 8 The
court, therefore, read the term "line of sight" only to include an
unobstructed view of the screen for disabled moviegoers since a
holding otherwise would "require district courts to interpret the ADA
based upon the subjective and undoubtedly diverse preferences of
disabled moviegoers." 89

II. How CLEAR IS THE CURRENT STATE OF THE SIGHTLINE
REGULATIONS?

Some commentators believe that most of the holes that existed
in the old ADAAG regulations have been addressed, leaving only a few
ambiguities. 90 While it is true that the new regulations are
significantly more instructive than the old in providing specific
requirements for both horizontal and vertical dispersion, the
ambiguity left by the current regulation in the area of lines of sight
does not necessarily resolve the current circuit split. The regulation
requires that wheelchair-based lines of sight provide spectators with
"viewing angles that are substantially equivalent to, or better than,
the choices of... viewing angles available to all other spectators." 91
The advisory portion of section 221.2.3 goes on to provide that:
85.
Id. at 787 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 2296, 2314 (Jan. 22, 1992); 56 Fed. Reg. 35408,
35440 (July 26, 1991)).

86.
87.

Id. at 788.
Id.

88.
Id. at 788-89 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 73.685 (2000); 46 C.F.R. § 13.103 (2000); 36
C.F.R. § 2.18 (2000)).
89.
Lara, 207 F.3d at 789.
90.
Laura K. McKibbin, The ADA Takes on the Movie Industry: Do the Disabled
Have a Right to the Best Seats in the House?, 38 U.S.F. L. Rev. 831, 849-54 (2004).
91.
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings
and Facilities; Architectural Barriers Act (ABA) Accessibility Guidelines, 36 C.F.R. pt.
1191.1, app. B, § 221.2.3 (2005).
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[I]ndividuals who use wheelchairs must be provided equal access so that their
experience is substantially equivalent to that of other members of the audience.
Thus, while individuals who use wheelchairs need not be provided
with the best
92
seats in the house, neither may they be relegated to the worst.

This section has its own share of problems, one of which is that
it does not solve the dilemma created by the circuit split. This is
because the newly amended version of the ADAAG is to be applied
"during the design, construction, additions to, and alterations of sites,
facilities, buildings, and elements to the extent required by regulations
issued by Federal agencies under the [ADA]."93 Since the amendments
only affect new construction and alterations, that means that movie
theater owners are left to deal with the interpretations set out by the
different circuits in the split decision. In his dissent in Oregon
Paralyzed Veterans, Judge Kleinfeld stated that since the circuit
decisions are "retroactive as judicial decisions generally are,
thousands of movie theaters will discover that they are out of
compliance with the law, and must destroy facilities built in
compliance with the law according to the best knowledge of design
94
professionals at the time."
While the goal of such a regulation is one that needs to be
accomplished, the DOJ has left the complaints of the court in Lara
largely unanswered by replacing old ambiguous language with new
ambiguous language. 95 Courts are still left to decide what
"substantially equivalent" viewing angles are, or, for that matter,
which angles are better than any others. 96 The argument still remains
that requiring something more than an unobstructed view of the
screen would "require district courts to interpret the ADA based upon
the subjective and undoubtedly diverse preferences of disabled
97
moviegoers."
However, the Lara court's approach does not seem to advance
the goal of the ADA "to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities." 98 This is because it does not confront the problem

92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id. § 101.1 (emphasis added).
Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 339 F.3d 1126, 1134 (9th

Cir. 2003).
95.
See Lara v. Cinemark U.S.A., Inc., 207 F.3d 783, 787 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding
that, under the old ADA guidelines the term 'lines of sight comparable" meant nothing
more than giving disabled moviegoers an unobstructed view).
96.
See 36 C.F.R. pt. 1191.1, app. B (2006) (containing no definitions for the words
"substantially", "equivalent", or "experience").
97.
Lara, 207 F.3d at 789.
98.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2000).
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created at all, but instead lets the theater owners who simply provide
unobstructed views of screens at terrible angles to continue at the
status quo. It is equally questionable that the current regulation of
lines of sight, section 221.2.3, "provide[s] clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals
with disabilities," another goal of the ADA. 99
A. The Necessity of Regulation

Without any regulation of viewing angles, and even with
dispersion requirements, disabled persons could easily be forced to sit
in the areas of the theater that are less popular. When the ADA was
passed in 1990, Congress stated that "some 43,000,000 Americans
have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is
increasing as the population as a whole is growing older."'100 Congress
went on to find that:
[H]istorically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with
disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem;

[Tihe Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure
equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic selfsufficiency for such individuals .... 101

Historically, since there was no proper regulation in this area,
disabled persons - as a discreet and insular minority - "have often

had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination."' 0 2
Stadium seating has become the benchmark in the movie
theater industry. 10 3 In 2002, American Multi-Cinema, Inc. (AMC)
owned 84 theater complexes around the United States, all of which
had been altered or built after 1995 using stadium seating.'0 4 In one of
AMC's stadium seating theaters, there were twenty-four screens,
twenty of which had no wheelchair seating in the stadium area of the
auditorium. 10 5 All of the wheelchair seating was located on a sloped

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id. § 12101(a)(1).
Id. § 12101(a)(2), (8).
Id. § 12101(a)(4).
United States v. AMC Entm't, Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1096 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
Id.
Id.
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floor in the front of the theater. 10 6 This kind of seat grouping is
10 7
expressly forbidden by the ADAAG.
This case goes a long way towards illustrating why some sort of
regulation in the area of lines of sight and the viewing angles is
necessary. The facts in AMC showed that, very soon after AMC opened
its first stadium-seating theater, several patrons began to complain of
discomfort after watching movies when subjected to seating that was
located at the front of the auditorium.10 8 Further:
[T]he Government . . . also presented evidence that wheelchair-bound customers
experience other conditions that detract from their moviegoing experience. These
customers report that they suffer from a sense of embarrassment and isolation
from being relegated to a section of the theater where no one else is sitting. Other
customers have described feelings of anger and humiliation, or report
a feeling of
10 9
being watched because everyone else in the audience is behind them.

B. Analyzing the Majority Positionand Section 221.2.3
While the majority circuits agree that viewing angles are to be
considered, they differ as to exactly what is required to be in
compliance with the ADA. The Oregon Paralyzed Veterans court
found that the DOJ amicus brief interpreting the "lines of sight
comparable" portion of the regulation to require that "wheelchair
locations must be provided with lines of sight in stadium seating seats
within the range of viewing angles as those offered to most of the
general public in the stadium style seats, adjusted for seat tilt"
deserved considerable deference. 110 The court in Oregon Paralyzed
Veterans stated that it was only to decide "whether it is unreasonable
for DOJ to interpret 'comparable line of sight' to encompass factors in
addition to physical obstructions, such as viewing angle. The answer,
in light of the plain meaning of the regulation both in general and as
understood in the movie theater industry, is 'no.' 111
But Judge Kleinfeld stated that the Ninth Circuit decision
"sets up a conflict with the Fifth Circuit, adopts an unreasonable
construction of the applicable regulation, and puts theater owners in a
position of impossible uncertainty as to what they must do to comply
106.
Id.
107.
See Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for
Buildings and Facilities; Architectural Barriers Act (ABA) Accessibility Guidelines, 36
C.F.R. pt. 1191.1, app. B, § 221.2.3 (2005).
108.
AMC, 232 F. Supp. 2d at 1097.
109.
Id.
110.
Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 339 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th
Cir. 2003).
111.
Id. at 1132.
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with the law.""12 At the time of the Oregon Paralyzed Veterans
decision, the Access Board was considering releasing a suggested
regulation to provide wheelchair patrons lines of sight that were
better than those enjoyed by half of the patrons in the movie theater,
but met resistance from design professionals who complained that it
would be difficult to tell if they complied with the law. 113
The Access Board stated that it intended to include technical
provisions in a new regulation."1 4 However, section 221.2.3 does not
contain any technical information.15 Judge Kleinfeld noted that, after
the Oregon Paralyzed Veterans decision, "[t]heater owners in the
Ninth Circuit have no guidance from the majority on how to build
their theaters, other than to stop doing what they are doing now."" 6
Even if the standard proffered were less ambiguous, there is no
standard to determine how many degrees off the general public's lines
of sight the wheelchair viewers' lines cannot be, nor is it clear how
much of the seating dispersed about the theater must be within such
requirements.
Perhaps even worse than the ambiguity left by the Ninth
Circuit in Oregon Paralyzed Veterans, is the Sixth Circuit in Cinemark
leaving the decision to the district court as to what kind of viewing
angle was appropriate. 1 7 Without at least a standard that
encompasses the entire circuit, movie theater owners are left with
little direction within an individual district, much less between
different ones. Cinemark and Regal Cinemas are both large,
nationwide corporations and it seems extraordinary to expect them to
attempt to contend with a different set of regulations set up by the
judiciary in each circuit, or district.
In Hoyt's, the First Circuit remanded after encouraging the
district court to walk a very fine equitable line between the two
parties." 8 The court remanded because the district court's "blanket
determination-that all slope-only wheelchair placements are inferior,
whatever the size or configuration of the theater-is multiply
flawed." 1 9 The court went on to state that it was not sure "[w]hether a

112.
Id. at 1133 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
113.
Id. at 1134.
114.
Id.
115.
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings
and Facilities; Architectural Barriers Act (ABA) Accessibility Guidelines, 36 C.F.R. pt.
1191.1, app. C, § F221.2.3 (2005).
116.
Or. Paralyzed Veterans, 339 F.3d at 1136 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting.).
117.
United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569, 579 (6th Cir. 2003).
118.
United States v. Hoyt's Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558 574-75 (1st Cir. 2004).
119.
Id. at 570.
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remand will entail trench warfare litigation on a theater-by-theater
120
basis or whether there are shortcuts" to determine compliance."
These courts seem to be going in the right direction. Despite
their attempts to create ad hoc standards out of vague administrative
regulations, the First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have at least put
some regulatory meat on the bare bones of the law. 12 1 As the First
Circuit stated, the best meaning of the statute - as it currently stands
- is not found within the text of the law but in the "underlying policy
of the statue."'122 Even if the statute's provided regulations are vague,
that does not mean that they should be considered ineffective. Still,
without some sort of overarching regulation, the movie theater owners
may be left to face liability in one section of the country while the
exact same viewing angle is found to be passable in another section.
This leaves the owners in the untenable position of trying to guess
which standard they will face in each circuit for their stadium seating
theaters.
The advisory portion of section 221.2.3 does not provide much
more guidance than the section itself. The advisory portion of the
statute makes reference to the "experience" of the moviegoer as
compared to non-disabled viewers, and states that "while individuals
who use wheelchairs need not be provided with the best seats in the
house, neither may they be relegated to the worst."1 23 The latter
statement seems to provide no direction, since it simply states that the
seats provided to wheelchair using patrons should fall somewhere
between the best and worst provided to the general public.
The sections dealing with horizontal and vertical dispersion
explicitly exclude theaters with less than 300 seats so long as the
viewing angles provided by the available wheelchair seating have a
viewing angle as good as the average viewing angle provided in the
facility. 24 From this, it seems likely that the Access Board intended
for wheelchair seats dispersed in the stadium section of a theater to

120.
Id. at 572.
121.
See Hoyt's Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d at 566 (finding that section 4.33.3 of the
ADAAG might be read to include angles of lines of sight to further the ADA even if that is
not the result the drafters intended); Or. Paralyzed Veterans, 339 F.3d at 1133 (finding
that section 4.33.3 of the ADAAG "require[d] a viewing angle for wheelchair seating within
the range of angles offered to the general public in the stadium-style seats"); Cinemark
USA, 348 F.3d at 572 (remanding to the district court to determine what lines of sight are
comparable).
122.
Hoyt's Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d at 567.
123.
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings
and Facilities; Architectural Barriers Act (ABA) Accessibility Guidelines, 36 C.F.R. pt.
1191.1, app. C, § F221.2.3 (2005).
124.
See id. at app. B, § 221.2.3.1-2.
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have at least the same viewing angle as that of the average of all
viewing angles available in the theater. This standard could be
dangerous, however, because if the viewing angle is changed a few
degrees up or down from the average then courts are left with the
discretion to decide which angles are "substantially similar."
Section 802.2 of the ADA Accessibility Guidelines provides
further guidance into how wheelchair user seating should be
located. 125 However, there is no information contained in the section
as to what the viewing angles from those seats should be to the
screen. 126 Instead, the section simply illustrates how the seats should
be arranged so that wheelchair-using viewers can see over people
seated in the first row at the same angle as those sitting in a similar
area.127 This sort of detail is a step in the right direction since it
clearly provides exactly how wheelchair users in stadium seating are
to view the screen, but it does not alleviate the issue of what viewing
angles movie theater owners should provide to disabled viewers.
C. Analyzing the Minority Position

While the majority position and the current set of regulations
found in the ADA have their own problems, the position espoused in
Lara may be even more problematic. The Fifth Circuit's approach in
that case does not apply to the newly reworded section 221.2.3 since it
was decided under the wording of the now repealed section 4.33.3.
However, judicial decisions generally apply retroactively and
consequently the law as interpreted under section 4.33.3 is still
relevant to any theaters built while the old regulation was in force.
Prior to Lara, the Access Board stated that the DOJ was
litigating so
[T]hat wheelchair seating locations [in stadium-style theaters] must: (1) be placed

within the stadium-style section of the theater ... ; (2) provide viewing angles that
are equivalent or better than the viewing angles ... provided by 50 percent of the
seats in the auditorium, counting all seats of any type sold in that auditorium; and
(3) provide a view of the screen, in terms of lack of obstruction.., that is in the top
50 percent of all seats of any type sold in the auditorium. The Board is considering
whether to include specific requirements in the final rule that are consistent with
12 8
the DOJ's interpretation of 4.33.3 pertaining to stadium-style movie theaters.

125.
See id. at app. D, § 802.2 (illustrating proper placement and sight lines over
individuals).

126.
127.

Id.
Id.

128.

Lara, 207 F.3d at 788 (citing 64 Fed. Reg., 622,248, 62278 (Nov. 16, 1999)).
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However, the Access Board also recognized that more language
would need to be added to section 4.33.3 in order to include viewing
129
angles in the definition of "lines of sight."
Without further guidance, the Fifth Circuit found that "[t]o
impose a viewing angle requirement at this juncture would require
district courts to interpret the ADA based upon the subjective and
undoubtedly diverse preferences of disabled moviegoers." 13 0 The Lara
court, therefore, found that the term "lines of sight comparable" in
section 4.33.3 included nothing more than an unobstructed view of the
131
screen.
The Fifth Circuit's position in Lara seems more equitable to
movie theater owners than the opinions written by the majority
circuits. Theater owners who found themselves suddenly out of
compliance with the law after a decision like the one in Oregon
Paralyzed Veterans would have to "destroy facilities built in
compliance with the law according to the best knowledge of design
professionals at the time."13 2 Under the Lara decision, all theaters but
the most egregious offenders (those that do not even supply disabled
patrons with an unobstructed view of the screen) would be safe from
suit until they decided to alter the existing theater or build a new one.
However, this position is adverse for disabled moviegoers. If
the law were to reflect Lara - which of course it does for theaters built
in the Fifth Circuit before section 221.2.3 took effect in 2005 theaters that are already in existence are not required to do any more
than provide unobstructed lines of sight, something that even seats in
the front row allow. 133 A disabled movie patron attending theaters
built before section 221.2.3 may still be forced to "crane his or her neck
at a very uncomfortable angle in order to view the feature on the
motion picture screen."'134 The Ninth Circuit found that this effectively
denied a "wheelchair-bound patron. .. the full and equal enjoyment of
the movie going experience." 13 5 Denying disabled patrons full
enjoyment of a movie is not within the purview of the ADA since the
Act recognizes that "society has tended to isolate and segregate
individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such
forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue
129.

130.

Id.
Id. at 789.
See id.
Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 339 F.3d 1126, 1134 (9th

131.
132.
Cir. 2003).
133.
Lara, 207 F.3d at 789.
134.
Or. Paralyzed Veterans, 339 F.3d at 1129.
135.
Id,
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to be a serious and pervasive social problem.' 1 36 Congress, therefore,
created the ADA to address "major areas of discrimination faced day137
to-day by people with disabilities."'
III. CLARIFYING THE REGULATIONS AND RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

The change from section 4.33.3 to section 221.2.3 is a step in
the right direction. However, this new regulation leaves several
important questions completely unanswered. Even if it assumed that
"viewing angles that are substantially equivalent to, or better than,
38
the choices of ... viewing angles available to all other spectators"'
means that the viewing angle of the wheelchair seats must be
"substantially equivalent" to the average viewing angles of all other
seats in that auditorium, it is not clear how far theater owners may
deviate from the mean before they will be held in violation of section
221.2.3.
Also, section 4.33.3 left a legacy of confusion. Since it was the
law when many of the existing stadium seating theaters were built, it
is the law that controls whether or not they are in compliance with the
ADA. Given the conflicting decisions handed down by the different
circuits, 13 9 theater owners now have very little, if any, guidance as to
what they should do in order for their old theaters to comply with the
old regulations; all they know is that it is not what they are presently
0
doing. 14
While decisions are generally applied retroactively, labeling an
act illegal that was legal at the time that the act was taken tends to
raise much higher judicial scrutiny and weighs in favor of making any
4
decisions to that effect prospective.' '
Equitable considerations do not operate only one way. The plight of the
disabled, whom Congress sought to protect starting over a decade ago, is the
central concern of the statute and a proper consideration - even in a due process
assessment. Even in a due process context, the public interest bears upon the
retroactivity to be allowed. 142

However, at this point, a decision that lacks retroactivity based on the
old statute would have no effect since movie theater owners who alter
136.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2000).
137.
Id. § 12101(b)(4).
138.
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for Buildings
and Facilities; Architectural Barriers Act (ABA) Accessibility Guidelines, 36 C.F.R. pt.
1191.1, app C, § F221.2.3 (2005).
139.
Compare Or. Paralyzed Veterans, 339 F.3d at 1137 with Lara, 207 F.3d at 788.
140.
Or. Paralyzed Veterans, 339 F.3d 1126 at 1136.
141.
United States v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 348 F.3d 569, 581 (6th Cir. 2003).
142.
United States v. Hoyt's Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558, 574 (1st Cir. 2004).
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their theaters in hopes of meeting the guidelines under which their
theaters were originally built will find themselves subjected to the
new language of section 221.2.3.143
As previously discussed, while the language in section 221.2.3
is easier to follow than the language in 4.33.3, it is still in need of
refinement. 14 4 Many of the regulations in the ADA specify down to the
millimeter exactly what is required to be in compliance with the
Act. 145 It is unclear why the Access Board could not provide a similar
level of specificity in dealing with the angles of sight lines. Such a
nationally promulgated and recognized regulation would be the best
way for the federal government to resolve this conflict and get the
results it wants.
However, as the situation presently exists, movie theater
owners may find compliance hard to achieve. In the First, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits, at least, movie theaters with stadium seating that do
not fall within the position espoused by the relevant court will find
themselves out of compliance. However, until section 221.2.3 has been
clarified at a national level, it should not be left to judges to guess
146
exactly what the Access Board desired.
The Access Board should find a range of viewing angles that it
finds satisfactory and hold new constructions and alterations to that
standard, one with a definite value that movie theater owners may
use to construct reliably compliant structures. Until that has occurred,
the courts should refrain from going after all but the most egregious
cases of theater construction problems in order to allow time for some
sort of national clarification to be made. At this point in time, it is
impossible to guess whether the First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits will
read the new law any differently from the old law and if the Fifth
Circuit will change its stance in relation to the clarity of the statute.
"In a court of equity it is legally possible, and almost surely wise in
this case, to decouple what is required prospectively from what is
47
required as to theaters already built."'

143.

36 C.F.R. pt. 1191.1, app. C, § F221.2.3 (stating that the Act applies to

alterations).
144.
See id. at app. B, § 221.2.3 (providing that viewing angles must be
"substantially equivalent to, or better than those provided to other spectators", but failing
to define "substantially equivalent" or state which viewing angles are any "better than" any
others).
145.
See, e.g., id. at app. D.
146.
Or. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., 339 F.3d 1126, 1137 (9th
Cir. 2003).
147.
United States v. Hoyt's Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558, 574 (1st Cir. 2004).
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IV. CONCLUSION

The United States has made great strides towards civil rights
for many groups over the last fifty years. 148 However, it was only in
1990 when disabled persons, a previously largely ignored minority,
were recognized as a great enough concern by Congress to enact the
ADA. 149 Although earlier measures had been taken to prevent
discrimination on the basis of disability, they were largely limited, or
riddled with a lack of enforcement. 50 The ADA required all newly
built or altered facilities that fell within its purview to meet certain
minimum specifications.
However, the original regulation dealing with lines of sight for
movie theater patrons in stadium seating did not necessarily include
viewing angles in its purview. 51 This ambiguous language caused the
circuits to split, leaving theaters in the First, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits possibly out of compliance with the law under which they
were built. The Access Board has since altered the regulations to
include viewing angles, but it has not clarified the ambiguity as to
what viewing angles are acceptable or what method should be used to
discern such angles. This leaves movie theater owners in the
untenable position of finding their old theaters suddenly out of
compliance and in need of alteration, but with no guidance as to
exactly what those alterations should be.
It is possible that the Access Board simply meant to codify the
DOJ's litigating position that the viewing angles provided to disabled
patrons should be substantially similar to the average viewing angle
of all other patrons in a theater. However, what - if any - action the
Access Board will take is unclear at this time. The Access Board
should alter the regulations as soon as possible to specify what angles
are required for disabled moviegoers.
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